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Abstract
The economic theory proposes two hypotheses for the relationship between wages and risk of
job loss due to rm (or plant) closure. The rst hypothesis posits that workers at greater risk
should be compensated by higher wages. This is known as the theory of compensating wage
dierentials. The second hypothesis states that workers at rms with a greater risk of closure
would be willing to exchange higher wages for longer-term stability in the job. This is known as
the theory of bargaining concessions. There is a paucity of empirical studies on this issue, and
the results have been inconsistent. The aim of this paper is to provide evidence for the Brazilian
manufacturing industry. To accomplish that, dierent risk measures, dierent databases, and
dierent econometric methods are used. All the tests performed in this study conrm the theory
of compensating wage dierentials.
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11 Introduction
The economic theory proposes two hypotheses concerning the relationship between wages and risk of
layo due to rm closure. The rst hypothesis posits that workers at higher risk should be compensated
by an increase in wages. The second hypothesis, however, states that workers holding a job at rms
with higher risks of closure would accept exchanging higher wages for longer-term stability in the job.
The rst hypothesis described above is known as the theory of compensating wage dierentials.
The idea that the risks taken by workers would be compensated by higher wages has been supported
by the economic literature since the publication of The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith 1.
The notion of bargaining concessions is more recent and was originally developed by Cappelli (1985)
and Cappelli & Sterling (1988). In Cappelli (1985), the author closely follows wage negotiations in
meat-packing and tire industries in the USA in 1981. The author notes that the negotiations conducted
at one third of the rms implied wage concessions by workers. The author hypothesizes and presents
the results that conrm the argument that wage concessions are originally made by workers at rms
with greater risks of layo or shutdown 2.
The sections in this paper will describe the available evidence of the relationship between wages
and layo risk due to rm closure. The methods for identication and estimation of this relationship
will be introduced and discussed in light of the few available literature studies on the subject.
It is interesting to note that empirical studies do not take into account the reason why a rm (or
plant) shuts down (due to closure or bankruptcy) and lays o its workers is not relevant, i.e., they only
assume the risk of job loss for the worker.
This paper will also show that, due to the specicities of Brazilian labor laws, the hypothesis
above becomes quite restrictive. The costs involving rm closure in Brazil (severance payments) are
high because of contract termination clauses and benets accumulated by workers throughout the
employment period.
The risks and costs incurred by a worker laid o by rms in the process of shutting down may be
signicantly lower than those incurred by workers laid o by rms in the process of bankruptcy.
Given this dierence in the "quality"of job destruction, some questions are raised: should one
expect the same result for the relationship between wages and risk for "rms facing high likelihood
of closure" and "rms facing high likelihood of bankruptcy"? Would the workers who hypothetically
accept earning less in order to keep their jobs at a "rm at risk for closure" do the same at a "rm at
risk for bankruptcy"? Would these workers be willing to bargain and to concede a share of their wages
even under the hypothesis that the rm will take the severance pay and run by declaring bankruptcy?
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence for the Brazilian manufacturing industry. To do that,
dierent risk measures, dierent databases, and dierent econometric methods are used so as to make
the results more robust. All the tests performed in this study corroborate the theory of compensating
wage dierentials.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a survey into the empirical literature on
this topic. Section 3 describes risk measures, taking into account the specicities of Brazilian labor
laws in the study period. Section 4 presents the data, descriptive statistics, econometric specications
and the results. Section 5 concludes and shows the nal remarks.
1See Rosen (1986), Ehrenberg (1985), and Viscusi (1978) for theoretical formalizations of Smith's insight.
2 Blanchower (1991) provides a model of bargaining concession
22 Survey of Empirical Evidence
There are few empirical studies on the relationship between wages and risk, and the obtained results
are not consistent. The aim of this section is to provide a survey into the empirical literature on the
topic.
Hamermesh (1988) used information of 114 workers who left their previous job between 1977 and
1981 because of plant closure, and 2,433 workers who were not displaced during this period. His data
came from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). His results show that shocks that increase
the probability of displacement also reduce wage increase, which means that wages grow less rapidly
in plants that will close soon.
Dunne & Roberts (1990) examine the empirical relationship between the probability for a plant
to close down and the compensation paid to employees in the plant. They used a micro dataset
on over 6,500 U.S. manufacturing plants for the 1974-1978 period (Annual Survey of Manufactures).
They developed a two-equation empirical model of plant failure and wage determination. They found
evidence of compensating dierentials for the risk of displacement due to plant closure.
Blanchower (1991) studied pay determination in Britain and the US in the 1970s and 1980s. The
British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA) and the U.S. General Social Surveys (GSS) are used in order to
test the relationship between wages and unemployment likelihood (fear of redundancy). These surveys
provide worker level information on perceptions of the chance of losing the job. The author found out
that "`fear of unemployment appears to depress pay substantially. Workers who expect to be made
redundant earn 9% less in the UK, and 22% less in the U.S., ceteris paribus"'
Carneiro & Portugal (2006) provide a simultaneous equation model of rm closure and wage deter-
mination in order analyze how wages adjust to unfavorable shocks that rise the risk of displacement
through rm closure, and to what extent a change in wage aects the likelihood of shutdown. The data
used in their work were obtained from the Portuguese Survey, "`Quadros de Pessoal"', and include all
workers that lost their jobs in Portugal during 1994, 1995 or 1996 due to rm closure. A control group,
with no job losers, is used in order to compare workers' and rms' characteristics before the event.
The results show that the fear of job loss generates bargaining concessions instead of compensating
dierentials.
Except for Blanchower (1991), all other authors select closed-down and surviving rms (or rm-
aliated workers) at time t and compare the growth levels of wages (paid or received) by each group
in previous periods. All of these papers imply the hypothesis that the reason why a rm (or plant),
either one at risk of closure or one at risk of bankruptcy, closes down and lays o its employees is not
relevant, i.e., only the risk of job loss is assumed.
If the amount of severance payment is negligible, there would not be a striking dierence in the risk
taken by a worker at a "rm at risk for closure" or at a "rm at risk for bankruptcy." On the other
hand, in an economy where severance payments are sizable and strongly inuence workers' incentives,
the dierences in the "quality" of job destruction should be taken into account. One of the aims of
the present paper is to attempt to control such dierences in the risk taken by workers.
3 Risk Measures, Labor Laws and Macroeconomic Instability
3.1 Labor Laws
The previous section showed that each of the empirical studies available in the literature implies the
hypothesis that the reason why a rm (or plant) lays o its employees is not relevant, i.e., it is assumed
that the worker only loses his/her job.
3Depending on the labor law in eect and on the labor costs for rm closure, the risks and probable
costs incurred by the worker when he/she is hired by a a rm at risk for closure are signicantly lower
than those incurred by a worker hired by a bankruptcy-prone rm.
In the Brazilian case, where layo results in high costs (severance payments) for the employer3,
this means that not only the job and wage are at stake. A bankruptcy-prone rm may have to lay
o its employees and might not have enough money to pay for employment contract termination and
severance agreements.
Legally speaking, the rights or benets of a worker at a debtless liquidated rm and from a bankrupt
rm are just the same. The dierence lies in how these benets are paid. The worker of a debtless
liquidated rm will get the severance payment at the time of layo. On the other hand, the workers
of a bankrupt rm must await the legal decisions on rm liquidation and the sharing of the bankrupt
estate.
In these cases, there is no guarantee that the rm's bankrupt estate is suciently large to cover
outstanding liabilities. Another aspect to be considered is that the bankrupt estate may include non-
liquid assets (machinery and buildings), as well as technologically obsolete assets (e.g.: typewriters).
Given the specicities of the Brazilian labor laws, the present paper suggests that the desirable
measure of risk of job loss should capture, at least partially, the "quality" (or should control the
heterogeneity) of job destruction, i.e., make a distinction between the likelihood of layo due to closure
and that which arises from bankruptcy.
The nancial literature provides a set of equity and nancial indicators that add this desirable
characteristic to the risk measure. Some of these indicators show the capacity of rms with regard to
debt payment, leverage, and solvency. These indicators are used by nancial and banking institutions
to assess the granting of corporate credit and loans, and are also used by the rms when deciding on
new investments or even on their exiting the market.
These nancial and equity indicators have an additional role in the longitudinal (panel data) analy-
sis of the relationship between wages and risk. A limitation of the available empirical studies concerns
the fact that the identication of a rm at greater risk of layo occurs, in most cases, at the time the
rm exits the market.
This form of identication imposes a very strong restriction on the analysis between wages and risk,
since a rm at lower risk is a surviving rm, whereas a rm at risk is a rm that exited the market.
This type of risk measure can neither capture the heterogeneity of the nancial quality of surviving
rms, nor the variations in quality over time within the same rm. Financial recovery or a quick equity
deterioration due to exogenous shocks may contribute to identifying the relationship between wages
and risk in panel data.
A hypothesis raised herein is that workers assess the level of wage concession in bargaining or the
level of wage compensation required by the risk according to the diculty of the rm in fullling its
future commitments.
A controversial issue in the nancial literature concerns the most appropriate way to measure the
probability of a rm going into bankruptcy. This controversy implies the discussion about which
nancial and equity indicators should be used, which weight each indicator should have on the forecast
model and which statistical treatment is ideal.
3The high cost for the employer with regard to contract termination consists of a 50% penalty over the entire amount
deposited in the severance pay indemnity fund (FGTS) of each employee. For characteristics and implications of the
FGTS, refer to Gonzaga (2004) and Vodopivec (2006).
43.2 Risk Measurement by Financial Ratios
Financial ratios indicate the performance and nancial situation of rms. These indicators have been
used as regressors or components of bankruptcy likelihood models (Tamari (1966),Altman (1968),Gen-
try et al. (1987)). These indicators are also used to assess corporate ratings. Financial ratios are
usually classied into ve dierent categories: liquidity ratios, asset turnover ratios, nancial leverage
ratios, protability ratios, and dividend policy ratios.
An argument that runs counter to the use of nancial ratios to predict rm bankruptcy is that
bankrupt rms show greater nancial instability than surviving rms. Martikainen & Ankelo (1991)
suggest that "`this instability apparently causes signicant problems when predicting corporate failure
using nancial ratios"'.
It is not within the scope of this paper to infer on the quality and explanatory power of nancial
ratios in predicting corporate failure. The most important is that nancial ratios indicate to the general
public that some rms are nancially unhealthier than others in a given time period - which does not
necessarily mean that nancially unhealthier rms will go into bankruptcy in subsequent periods.
The next sections show that this paper uses a panel of manufacturing rms obtained from the
Annual Industrial Survey (PIA - Pesquisa Industrial Anual) microdata. This survey provides individual
and in-depth information about the revenue and expenditure frameworks of each rm; however, equity
information, such as asset and liability frameworks, is not provided.
As previously mentioned, there is a wide range of nancial ratios and a limitation of this study is
that most of these nancial ratios are built from balance sheet information. Few nancial ratios are
built solely from revenue and expenditure information.
Some nancial ratios, such as gross prot margin, are built only from sales and costs information4,
but the use of this measure can be a hindrance to the purpose of this study. If there is a large correlation
between costs and sales revenues, there will also be a large correlation between gross prot margin and
markup (proxy for the bargaining power of the rm in the product market). The problem is that a
relationship between wages and gross prot margin would, under these circumstances, be testing the
hypothesis of rent sharing.






Where EBIT are the earnings before interest and taxes.
The ICR is a way to measure rm solvency, i.e., it indicates the capacity a rm has to pay the debt
interests owed to third parties using its own nancial resources. An ICR equal to 2 means that a rm
can pay as much as twice the value of overdue interests. An acceptable ICR value depends on several
factors, including the industrial sector in which the rm operates, competition within this sector, the
type of rm (either publicly or privately owned). However, a rule of thumb suggests that an ICR of
1.5 represents the minimum value for the safety margin required for any rm in any sector.
3.3 Risk and Macroeconomic Instability
The ICR can also be regarded as a measure of rm leverage. These ICR properties are very desirable
for the analysis of the nancial health of Brazilian rms throughout the study period (1996-2002).
4Gross Prot Margin=(Revenue-Cost of Goods Sold)/Revenue
5Within this time frame, the Brazilian economy experienced several bouts of uncertainty produced
by foreign and domestic factors, such as the Asian crisis (1997), the Russian crisis (1998), the Brazilian
exchange rate crisis (1999), the Brazilian electric power crisis (2001), the Argentine exchange rate crisis
(2002) and the crisis stirred up by the uncertainty over the outcome of Brazil's presidential elections
(2002).
In some of these episodes, the Brazilian central bank swiftly manipulated the basic Selic rate so as
to contain ination expectations and avoid capital ight. Figure 1 shows the behavior of the Selic rate
between January 1996 and December 2002.
Figure 1 clearly shows two dierent behaviors of the Selic rate before and after the depreciation of
the Real and adoption of the oating exchange rate system (January 1999). Since the implementation
of the Real Plan (plan for stabilization of ination) in 1994, Brazil had a controlled exchange rate
system that was abandoned in January 1999. On the graph, this period is characterized by higher
interest rates and a more volatile behavior. After the depreciation of the Real and the adoption of the
oating exchange rate system, both interest rates and volatility decreased. Even though interests were
reduced in 1999, Brazil had one of the world's highest real interest rates throughout the period (See
Table 1).
The nancial crises, the change in the exchange rate system, and the monetary policy adopted by
the Brazilian central bank strongly inuenced rm businesses. This inuence on industrial sales can be
clearly seen in Figure 2. Again, it is possible to note two dierent behaviors. Before the change in the
exchange rate system, industrial sales showed a moderate uptrend. After January 1999, this uptrend
continued in more strong way, but industrial sales fell after 2001 due to the Brazilian electric power
crisis. Industrial sales only increased again after the uncertainty over the 2002 presidential elections
was over.
Finally, one should consider the role of macroeconomic stability and of the variation in monetary
cost (interest rates) in rms' investment decisions, and in their entry into and exit from the market.
Table 2 shows the data on the level of restriction of some variables upon investment decisions of
Brazilian rms. These data were obtained from World Bank Investment Climate Brazil 2003. This
survey provides individual information about 1,640 Brazilian manufacturing rms assessed in 20035.
The results of interest are reported in the Mean column. The values for the levels of restriction
are 0 (=no restriction), 1 (=low restriction), 2 (=moderate restriction), 3 (=severe restriction) and
4 (=extremely severe restriction). Of 21 variables analyzed, four had means that were higher than
restriction level 3: tax rates (3.25), cost of nancing (3.19), economic and regulatory policy uncertainty
(3.12), and macroeconomic instability (3.07).
The information above suggests that the study period and the risk measure used in this paper
can properly capture rm heterogeneity in terms of nancial fragility and exposure to macroeconomic
shocks. The several exogenous shocks experienced by rms in the analyzed period may have produced
large variation in ICR indicators, thus contributing towards an easier identication of the relationship
between wage and risk of displacement.
4 Methods and Results
4.1 Data
The present paper uses information from two databases: (1) RAIS (Annual Social Information Report);
and (2) PIA (Annual Industrial Survey). The study assesses the 1996-2001 period, and all nominal
5Further details about this survey are provided in the data presentation of this paper.
6variables used herein are calculated using the prices for 2001, deated by the Brazilian consumer price
index (INPC).
The sample used herein includes information about an unbalanced panel of 39,710 Brazilian man-
ufacturing rms. The sample comprises only rms with over 30 employees. The number of rms
appearing only one year in the panel is 9652; 5,804 rms appear two years; 4,935 rms appear three
years; 3,891 rms appear four years; 3,513 rms appear ve year; and 11,915 rms appear six years,
thus totaling 39,710 dierent rms, and 140,684 observations.
The PIA information includes rm size (employment), sales revenues, exports, operating expenses,
nancial expenses (interests), prots and taxes.
The RAIS information includes the mean wage per rm, level of education, age and job tenure.
The single identication of each Brazilian rm through the Federal Employer Identication Number
(Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jur dica - CNPJ) allows linking the RAIS and PIA information.
A third database (World Bank Investment Climate, Brazil 2003) is used to provide PIA-RAIS
estimates with robust results. This survey provides individual information about 1,640 Brazilian
manufacturing rms surveyed in 2003, but nancial and equity information is available for the year
2002 (some variables are available for 2000 and 2001).
An advantage of the World Bank Investment Climate database is that it provides nancial and
equity information about the rm and also information about workforce (wages and level of education
of workers). A limitation of this survey is that it is available for a single year (2003) only.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables obtained from the link between the RAIS and PIA databases
are shown in Table 3. The means and standard deviations are provided for each variable and separately
for each sampled year. Variables with money values are expressed using prices for 2001, deated by
the INPC.
Note that in Table 3 the mean weekly wage showed a real increase in 1997 (194.05) compared to
that of the previous year (191.32). However, in subsequent years, there was a considerable reduction
in real wages, which averaged 181.08 in 2001.
Throughout the analyzed period, the mean level of education of workers remarkably increased,
being equivalent to a rise in approximately 1 year in schooling between 1996 (6.35 years) and 2001
(7.37). Unlike wages and level of education, there was no statistically signicant dierence in mean
age and job tenure.
With regard to rm characteristics, one should mention the reduction in the mean size of rms
throughout the period (from 178.06 workers in 1996 to 154.64 workers in 2001) and the increase in
mean export rates and in sales from 1999 onwards (year in which the exchange rate regime was shifted).
The ICR is reported in three distinct ways: (1) ICR/1000, where the ICR value is divided by 1,000;
(2) ln(ICR), where the logarithm of ICR is obtained and observations of ICR  0 are discarded; and
(3) the Solvency dummy variable, where Solvency=1 if ICR > 1:5 and Solvency=0 if ICR  1:5 (as
previously stated, a rule of thumb suggests that an ICR of 1.5 is the minimum value for the safety
margin required for any rm in any sector).
The ICR/1000 values ranged from 11 in 1997 to 48 in 2001. This means that in 1997 Brazilian
manufacturing rms could pay on average 11,000 times the interests of their debts using their own
resources.
By analyzing the standard deviations of the ICR/1000 variable and the values of the Solvency
variable (mean of 0.48 for the period) it seems clear that the group of Brazilian manufacturing rms
7shows large heterogeneity in terms of nances and equity. By analyzing the standard deviations of the
ln(ICR) variable it is possible to infer that heterogeneity is large even amongst nancially healthier
rms (rms with ICR > 0).
The descriptive statistics of the variables obtained from the World Bank Investment Climate, Brazil
2003 are described in Table 11. The mean wage and mean level of education in 2002 were larger than
those obtained from the RAIS-PIA database for 2001. Nevertheless, it is not possible to clearly identify
whether this is due to a real increase in wages and in the mean level of education of workers or whether
it is related to dierences in the rm characteristics of each sample.
Firm size and sales growth yielded quite dierent values across the samples. Mean employment
according to the World Bank amounted to 77.18 workers in 2002 vis- a-vis 150 workers in the RAIS-PIA
database6. Sales growth according to the World Bank survey amounted to 0.20 in 2002 comparatively
to 0.07 in the RAIS-PIA database for 2001. Again, it is not possible to determine how much of such
dierence is due to accelerated sales growth in 2002 and how much is due to sampling dierences.
Unlike the other variables, ICR/1000, ln(ICR) and Solvency are available for years 2000 to 2002, al-
lowing for their comparison with the RAIS-PIA database for the same period. Note that the ICR/1000
variable yielded mean values of 831 in 2000 and 836 in 2001 in the World Bank survey. According
to the RAIS-PIA database, these values were 45 and 48, respectively. The Solvency variable had a
mean value of 0.78 in the World Bank survey and of 0.48 in the RAIS-PIA database. The analysis
of means and standard deviations of these variables suggest that the World Bank database comprises
more homogenous and nancially healthier rms than those included in the RAIS-PIA database.
4.3 Cross-sectional analysis
This section describes the econometric models and the wage regression results for Brazilian rms. This
section provides the results obtained from the cross-sectional analysis and two econometric methods
are used: OLS estimates and instrumental variables estimates.
It is important to note that, dierent from matched RAIS-PIA panel (1996-2001), the World Bank
Investment Climate is a cross-sectional data set (2002), so a secondary goal of this subsection is to
check the robustness of cross-sectional empirical tests by using these dierent sources of data.
4.3.1 OLS estimates
This subsection presents the results obtained from OLS estimates for each sampled year. The econo-
metric model is specied in the equation that follows:
lnwj = 1ln(ICR)j + 0
1xj + j (2)
Where lnwj is the logarithm of the weekly wage paid by rm j, ln(ICR) is the logarithm of the
interest coverage ratio for rm j, x is a vector of variables related to the characteristics of rm j and
j is the random error.
This paper has shown so far that the economic theory posits two hypotheses for the relationship
between wages and the likelihood of rm death: the theory of compensating wage dierentials and the
theory of bargaining concessions.
The ultimate goal of this model is to obtain estimates for coecient 1 and then verify the sign
and statistical signicance of this coecient. In the model described above the ln(ICR)j variable
is supposed to capture the heterogeneity in nancial health of rms, which can explain the dierent
6Recall that the RAIS-PIA database includes only rms with over 30 employees. This explains the dierence in mean
rm size.
8probabilities of death for each rm. In this regard, a positive (negative) value for coecient 1 is
interpreted as bargaining concessions (compensating wage dierentials).
The specication of the ICR variable in logarithmic form restricts the sample to a group of rms
with EBIT > 0. This restriction rules out the set of rms in default situation, i.e., rms that cannot
at least pay overdue interests and taxes with their own resources.
The intention of using ln(ICR)j is to make 1 capture the relationship between wages and the
likelihood of rm exit. For this group of rms, it is assumed that the worker's risk is restricted only
to job loss.
The estimates for the model specied above were obtained for years 1996 to 2001 (using RAIS-PIA
data) and for 2002 (using the World Bank Survey data). The results for years 1996 to 2001 are reported
in Table 4.
All coecients 1 had negative and statistically signicant signs. The values of 1 ranged from
-0.014 in 1996 to -0.017 in 1998. All the other coecients related to vector 0
1 showed theoretically
consistent and statistically signicant signs. The value estimated for the year 2002 is shown in the rst
column of Table 12. Coecient 1 had a negative sign that was quite similar to the values obtained
for the previous years (-0.013).
A second specication of the ICR variable used herein is the binary Solvency variable. As mentioned
in the previous section, this variable is equal to 1 if ICR > 1:5 and equal to 0 if ICR  1:5. Note
that 1.5 is regarded as the minimum value required as safety margin for any rm in any sector. Unlike
ln(ICR)j, the Solvency variable does not exclude any rm from the sample and its aim is to make a
distinction between solvent and insolvent rms.
The specication with the Solvency variable is as follows:
lnwj = 
1Sj + 0
1xj + j (3)
Where lnwj is the logarithm of the mean weekly wage paid by rm j, Sj is the Solvency dummy
variable for rm j, x is a vector of variables related to the characteristics of rm j and j is the random
error.
The intention of using Sj is to make this dummy capture the relationship between wages and the
likelihood of rm bankruptcy. For this group of rms, it is assumed that the worker's risk is not limited
only to job loss, but that it includes the possibility for the non-payment of severance benets.
The estimates for the model specied in equation 3 were obtained for years 1996 to 2001 (using
RAIS-PIA data) and for 2002 (using the World Bank Survey data), as in the previous specication.
The results for 1996 to 2001 are shown in Table 5.
All coecients 
1 had negative and statistically signicant signs. The values of 
1 ranged from
-0.04 in 1996 and 2000 to -0.06 in 1998 and 1999. All the other coecients related to vector 0
1 showed
theoretically consistent and statistically signicant signs. The value estimated for the year 2002 is
shown in the second column of Table 12. Coecient 
1 had a negative and statistically signicant sign
that was quite lower than the values obtained for the previous years (-0.18).
The theory of compensating wage dierentials is corroborated for the Brazilian industry by all tests
used in this section. This result is strongly robust, since it has been conrmed for the available years,
for dierent specications of the risk variable and for dierent databases. A limitation of the tests
used concerns the hypothesis of exogeneity of the risk variable, which might be generating some bias
in the sign of coecients 1 and 
1. The next section will deal with this issue.
94.3.2 2SLS and 2SPLS estimates
The previous section showed that the theory of compensating wage dierentials was corroborated for
the Brazilian industry. Also, it was veried that the hypothesis of exogeneity of the risk variable might
be causing bias in the sign of coecients 1 and 
1, thus compromising the results obtained7.
This section takes into account the endogeneity and simultaneity of the wage and risk variables when
analyzing the relationship between them. The rst empirical test involves the relationship between
lnwj and ln(ICR)j, by using instrumental variables.
As both endogenous variables lnwj and ln(ICR)j are continuous, two-stage least square (2SLS)
estimators will be used for each sampled year. The vector of instrumental variables includes the lags
of the ln(ICR)j variable, i.e., ln(ICR)jt 1 and ln(ICR)jt 2.
Table 6 shows the coecients of the relationship between wages and risk for years 1998 to 2001.
There are no 2SLS estimates for 1996 and 1997, since these periods do not have enough lags for
instrumentalization and tests of overidentication for instrumental variables.
Table 7 shows the values for the coecients of instruments in auxiliary regressions, the Shea partial
R2 values (Shea (1997)) and the Sargan statistics (Arellano & Bond (1991)). The coecients of
instruments have positive and statistically signicant values, without any exception. The orthogonality
of instruments with the errors is conrmed for all regressions according to the values obtained for
the Sargan statistics. The explanatory power of the instruments over the endogenous variables is
satisfactory, as pointed out by Shea partial R2 values.
Once conrmed that the instruments used have satisfactory exogeneity and explanatory power
of endogenous variable ln(ICR)j, the interpretations of results in Table 6 demand less caution. All
coecients 1 in Table 6 have negative and statistically signicant signs. The values of 1 ranged from
-0.022 in 1999 and -0.025 in 1998. The 2SLS estimate for 2002 is shown in the third column of Table
12. Coecient 1 had a negative and statistically signicant sign (-0.017).
The second empirical test involves de model which the solvency variable, Sj, is used as proxy for
risk. As the model consists of a continuous endogenous variable lnwj and a binary endogenous variable,
Sj, it is necessary to use 2SPLS (Two Stages Probit Least Square) estimators8 for each sampled year.
The vector of instrumental variables wj includes the lag of the Sj variable, i.e., Sjt 1.
Table 8 shows the coecients of the relationship between wages and risk for years 1997 to 2001,
whereas Table 9 presents the results for the system's rst stage. All coecients 
1 have negative and
statistically signicant signs9. The values of 
1 ranged from -0.013 in 1998 to -0.018 in 2000. The
value estimated for 2002 is shown in the last column of Table 12. Coecient 
1 has a negative and
statistically signicant sign (-0.046).
Even after controlling for the endogeneity bias between wages and risk, the theory of compensating
wage dierentials is still corroborated for the Brazilian industry in all tests carried out in this section.
4.4 Longitudinal analysis
The previous sections showed that all estimates in the cross-sectional analysis corroborate the theory of
compensating wage dierentials for Brazilian rms. This section is going to deal with the longitudinal
analysis of the sample, i.e., it will provide the results obtained from panel data estimates. Two
approaches will be considered in this section: pooled regressions and xed-eect regressions.
7Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests were used for OLS and IV models. The IV model turned out to be the most
appropriate.
8See Amemiya (1978), Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003)
9Standard errors are corrected according to Keshk (2003).
104.4.1 Pooled regressions
In this section, the annual observations of rms (1996-2001) are pooled as cross-sectional time series
data10. The procedure implies the use of these data to reproduce the econometric methods previously
applied in the cross-sectional analysis, i.e., OLS regressions11. The major aims of this section are to
provide results that serve as baseline for the results to be developed with xed-eect estimates and to
provide the study with a robust analysis.
The rst specication to be presented concerns the pooled OLS regression, as shown in the following
equation:
lnwjt = 1ln(ICR)jt + 0
1xjt + 0t + jt (4)
Where t is a vector of dummies (or xed eects) for each sampled year.
The result for coecient 1 obtained from the pooled OLS regression is shown in the rst column of
Table 10. As with all previously reported results, the value of 1 is negative and statistically signicant
(-0.015).
The same procedure was used for the Solvency variable, as specied below:
lnwjt = 
1Sjt + 0
1xjt + 0t + jt (5)
Where t is a vector of dummies (or xed eects) for each sampled year.
The result for coecient 
1 obtained from the pooled OLS regression is shown in the third column
of Table 10. The value of 
1 is negative and statistically signicant (-0.052).
4.4.2 Fixed-eect regressions
A source of bias in econometric estimates that had not been addressed yet in this paper concerns
omitted variables. This section deals with this problem by using xed-eect estimates12. The aim is
to control for the unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity of rms.
The econometric specication of the xed-eect model using risk variable ln(ICR)jt is as follows:
lnwjt = 1ln(ICR)jt + 0
1xjt + 0t + 0j + jt (6)
Where j is a vector of xed eects for the rms.
The result for coecient 1 obtained from the xed-eect regression is shown in the second column
of Table 10. The value of 1 is negative and statistically signicant (-0.005).
Again, the same procedure was used for the Solvency variable, as specied below:
lnwjt = 
1Sjt + 0
1xjt + 0t + 0j + jt (7)
Where j is a vector of xed eects for the rms.
The result for coecient 
1 obtained from the xed-eect regression is shown in the last column
of Table 10. The value of 
1 is negative and statistically signicant (-0.037).
Even after controlling for the bias of omitted variables in the relationship between wages and risk,
the theory of compensating wage dierentials is corroborated in all tests carried out in this section.
10The longitudinal analysis includes only information from the RAIS-PIA database.
11The standard errors of the coecients obtained from pooled regressions are corrected for clusters, i.e., repeated
observations of the same rm.
12(Hausman (1978))'s specication test (Hausman (1978)) was used for random eect models and xed-eect models.
The xed-eect model turned out to be the most appropriate.
115 Final Remarks
The economic theory provides two hypotheses concerning the relationship between wages and risk of
layo due to rm closure: compensating wage dierentials and bargaining concessions. Nevertheless,
the empirical literature has not yielded consistent result.
This paper tests one hypothesis against the other in the Brazilian context, distinguishing between
risk of job loss and risk of bankruptcy. Workers laid o due to rm closure lose their jobs, whereas
workers laid o due to rm bankruptcy may have other types of losses relative to severance payments,
in addition to job loss.
Two dierent risk measures are used to overcome this restriction. The rst one, ln(ICR)j, captures
the relationship between wages and the likelihood of rm's exit. The second one, Sj, captures the
relationship between wages and the likelihood of rm bankruptcy.
In addition to using two dierent measures of risk in view of the dierent impact of bankruptcy
and closure on workers' income, this paper uses alternative databases and econometric methodologies
to test the hypothesis of compensating wage dierentials versus that of wage bargaining concessions.
The ndings do not support the hypothesis of bargaining concessions while they are in favor of the
hypothesis of compensating wage dierentials. This holds both for risk of job loss and of bankruptcy.
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Figure 1: Brazilian Monthly Interest Rate, SELIC
Source: www.ipeadata.gov.br
14Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Investment Climate Constraints
Variables Obs Weight Mean St.Dv.
Telecommunications 1640 17350 0.57 0.96
Electricity 1641 17354 1.18 1.31
Transportation 1641 17354 1.22 1.24
Access to Land 1626 17166 1.15 1.37
Tax rates 1641 17354 3.25 0.98
Tax administration 1636 17256 2.76 1.23
Trade Regulations 1245 12501 1.66 1.52
Customs Regulations 1221 12294 1.74 1.54
Labor regulations 1637 17247 2.53 1.26
Skills and education of available workers 1641 17354 2.11 1.18
Business Licensing and Operating permits 1636 17306 1.73 1.41
Patents and Registered Trademarks (INPI) 1579 16539 1.08 1.32
Standards and Quality (INMETRO) 1580 16592 1.24 1.32
Access to Financing (e.g.. collateral) 1616 17174 2.46 1.43
Cost of Financing (e.g. interest rates) 1623 17221 3.19 1.17
Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty 1639 17341 3.12 1.05
Macroeconomic instability (ination. exch rate) 1637 17291 3.07 1.02
Corruption 1634 17258 2.88 1.38
Crime. theft and disorder 1635 17317 2.49 1.45
Anti-competitive or informal practices 1634 17314 2.56 1.29
Legal system/conict resolution 1626 17206 1.89 1.37
Notes: (1) Source: World Bank Investment Climate 2003; (2) Investment degree of
constraint var=0=no constraint, var=1=low constraint, var=2=moderate constraint,
var=3=severe constraint, var=4=very severe constraint.
15Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, RAIS-PIA
Mean (Standard Deviation)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Variables
Weekly Wage 191.32 194.05 184.77 184.15 182.51 181.08
(327.38) (315.25) (249.15) (598.62) (803.07) (568.87)
Schooling (years) 6.35 6.66 6.79 7.00 7.17 7.37
(1.91) (1.89) (1.88) (1.89) (1.89) (1.90)
Age (years) 32.79 32.74 32.95 33.02 32.89 32.91
(4.00) (4.01) (4.00) (4.01) (3.95) (3.97)
Tenure (months) 45.14 45.40 46.98 47.80 46.18 45.07
(24.32) (24.72) (25.31) (26.31) (26.85) (26.93)
Firm Size (Employment) 178.06 178.54 157.52 156.87 163.53 154.64
(650.76) (648.59) (579.47) (574.51) (586.07) (569.36)
Exports/Sales ratio 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Sales - 0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.11 0.07
(0.43) (0.44) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45)
ICR/1000 33 11 38 28 45 48
(2665) (554) (3507) (2247) (2905) (3784)
Ln(ICR) 2.67 2.40 2.60 2.95 3.57 3.25
(3.75) (3.64) (3.84) (4.02) (4.03) (4.18)
Solvency 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Observations 22674 21642 22904 23678 23967 25819
Notes: (1) Monetary values in R$; (2) At 2001 prices, deated using INPC.
16Table 4: Regressions: Cross Sectional Analysis OLS, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Robust Standard Errors)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
Schooling (years) 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Age (years) 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure (months) 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ln Employment 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Exports/Sales ratio 0.87 0.54 0.71 0.75 0.88 0.92
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Ln(ICR) -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 15495 14709 15197 15885 16594 17810
F 165.84 158.91 175.78 176.81 172.44 166.11
R2 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwj; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**), and 90% (*); (3) All
regressions include additional controls: Constant, Age2, Tenure2, Exports/Sales ratio2, Dummies for
location (27 States), Dummies for Sector (3-digit).
17Table 5: Regressions: Cross Sectional Analysis OLS, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Robust Standard Errors)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
Schooling (years) 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age (years) 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure (months) 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Ln Employment 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Exports/Sales ratio 1.00 0.76 0.88 0.88 1.02 1.08
(0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Solvency -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 22505 21501 22703 23543 23820 25622
F 188.76 190.04 227.03 227.66 226.91 228.03
R2 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwj; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**), and 90% (*); (3) All
regressions include additional controls: Constant, Age2, Tenure2, Exports/Sales ratio2, Dummies for
location (27 States), Dummies for Sector (3-digit).
Table 6: Regressions: Cross Sectional Analysis 2SLS, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Robust Standard Errors)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
Schooling (years) 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age (years) 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure (months) 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Ln Employment 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Exports/Sales ratio 0.59 0.77 0.72 0.83
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Ln(ICR) -0.025 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 8079 8179 8279 8988
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwj; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**),
and 90% (*); (3) All regressions include additional controls: Constant, Age2,
Tenure2, Exports/Sales ratio2, Dummies for location (27 States), Dummies for
Sector (3-digit).
18Table 7: Regressions: Auxiliary Regression 2SLS, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Robust Standard Errors)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Regressors
Ln(ICR)t 1 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.44
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(ICR)t 2 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.24
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Shea Partial R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.34
F 1909 1946 1950 2346
Sargan 0.21 0.96 0.08 1.29
2 (0.64) (0.32) (0.76) (0.25)
Observations 8079 8179 8279 8988
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = Ln(ICR)t; (2) Signicant at 99%
(***), 95 % (**), and 90%.
Table 8: Regressions: Two Stages Probit Least Square Step 2, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Corrected Standard Errors)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Estimated Solvencyt -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 -0.015
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Schooling (years) 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age (years) 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.15
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Tenure (months) 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.007
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Ln Employment 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Exports/Sales ratio 0.71 0.88 0.83 0.99 1.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 18221 19126 19468 19570 20726
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwj; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**), and 90%
(*).
19Table 9: Regressions: Two Stages Probit Least Square Step 1, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Corrected Standard Errors)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Solvencyt (Endogenous)
Estimated ln hourly Wage -0.11 -0.21 -0.11 -0.08 -0.17
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Solvencyt 1 1.26 1.27 1.23 1.27 1.29
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Sales 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.60
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln Employment -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exports/Sales ratio -0.008 -0.121 0.52 0.48 0.58
(0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Observations 18221 19126 19468 19570 20726
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = Solvencyt; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**), and
90% (*).
Table 10: Regressions: Longitudinal Analysis Pooled and Fixed Eects, RAIS-PIA
Coecient (Standard Errors)
Pooled Firms FE Pooled Firms FE
Regressors
Schooling (years) 0.09 0.001 0.09 0.0026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.04
(0.01) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003)
Tenure (months) 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Ln Employment 0.04 -0.35 0.03 -0.37
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Exports/Sales ratio 0.78 0.09 0.94 0.14





Observations 95690 95690 139694 139694
F 203.38 207.31 322.71 343.63
R2 0.57 0.91 0.54 0.89
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwjt; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 %
(**), and 90%; (3) All regressions include additional controls: Constant, Age2,
Tenure2, Exports/Sales ratio2, Dummies for location (27 States), Dummies for
Sector (3-digit), and Dummies for years.
20Table 11: Descriptive Statistics, World Bank Investment Climate
Obs Weight Mean St.dv
Variables
Weekly Wage(2002) 1556 16475 188.30 802.36
Schooling (years)(2002) 1636 17328 8.07 1.91
Firm Age (years)(2002) 1642 17361 16.42 16.07
Firm Size (Employment)(2002) 1636 17265 77.18 227.29
Export Firm(2002) 1642 17361 0.20 0.40
Sales(2002) 1508 15683 0.20 0.51
Trade Union(2002) 1634 17296 0.57 0.43
ICR/1000(2002) 1495 15335 875 2600
ICR/1000(2001) 1460 14900 836 2160
ICR/1000(2000) 1421 14439 831 2310
Ln(ICR)(2002) 1273 12620 4.25 4.37
Ln(ICR)(2001) 1254 12564 4.29 4.19
Ln(ICR)(2000) 1226 12361 4.51 4.23
Solvency(2002) 1642 17361 0.75 0.43
Solvency(2001) 1642 17361 0.79 0.40
Solvency(2000) 1642 17361 0.82 0.38
Notes: (1) Monetary values in R$ at 2001 prices, deated using
INPC; (2) Weights are used.
21Table 12: Regressions: Cross Sectional Analysis, World Bank Investment Climate
Coecient
Regressors OLS OLS 2SLS 2SPLS
Schooling (years)(2002) 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm Age (years)(2002) 0.009 0.005 0.13 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.03)
Ln Employment 0.001 0.009 0.020 0.023
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022)
Export Firm(2002) 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.25
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Trade Union(2002) 0.01 0.003 0.07 0.05





Observations 1247 1546 1036 1471
F 13.94 19.26 15.68 23.88
R2 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.34
Notes: (1) Dependent variable = lnwj; (2) Signicant at 99% (***), 95 % (**),
and 90% (*); (3) All regressions include additional controls: Constant, Firm
Age2, Dummies for location (27 States), Dummies for Sector (2-digit).


































Figure 2: Brazilian Industrial Real Sales Index
Source: www.ipeadata.gov.br
23